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NOTES
CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWSA JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
In 1929, California enacted a financial responsibility law1 which,
in essence, requires the driver of an automobile involved in an accident to show proof of future financial responsibility. Under Vehicle
Code section 414 (presently section 16431) of the financial responsibility law, proof of ability to respond in damages may be given by
the written certificate of an insurance company authorized to do business within the state, certifying that a motor vehicle liability policy
has been issued to the driver and is in effect. Policies offered as
proof of future ability to respond in damages are subject to various
regulations. Section 415 (presently section 16451) of the financial
responsibility law provides that such policies must not only insure
the person named therein, but any other person using or responsible
for the use of the automobile with the express or implied permission
of the insured. The California courts have consistently been faced
with the question whether section 415 of the financial responsibility
law was limited to those policies offered as proof of financial responsibility or applicable to all policies issued within the state, both
certified and voluntary. The unique interpretation and application of
this section by the courts will be the subject of this note. Particular
emphasis will be placed upon the interpretation and application of
section 415 by the judiciary as contrasted with the apparent intent
of the legislature manifested by several amendments to said section.
As will be seen, the California courts have not been responsive to
indications from the legislature of an intent to overrule the judicial
interpretation and application.

The Need For Financial Responsibility Laws
In the five year period from 1961 to 1966, deaths due to traffic
accidents were sufficient to have extinguished the population of a
city the size of Richmond, Virginia, or Jacksonville, Florida.2 High-8
way injuries in the same period exceeded the population of California
and the gloomy forecast for 1975 is that there will be over 60,000
deaths attributable to automobile accidents. 4 These figures become
1 Cal. Stats. 1929, ch. 258, § 4, at 560-63; Cal. Stats. 1929, ch. 259, §§ 1-2,
at 563-65.
2 P. KEARNY, IGHWAY Hozmacin 2 (1966).
3 Id. at 2-3.
4

Id. at 3.
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even more alarming when one considers that many of the victims of
these accidents, who often are completely innocent, go uncompensated
for their injuries. 5
Various types of legislation have been enacted in the United
States in an attempt to solve or substantially diminish the problem
of the uncompensated automobile accident victim.
Public concern
has demanded some means of ensuring that innocent automobile
accident victims be compensated. Although there have been a num7
ber of plans proposed for compensation without regard to fault, most
American jurisdictions have retained the "fault" system. Plans adhering to this system are designed to guarantee that, when fault is
shown, the guilty motorist will be able to respond in damages.
Almost every state now has some type of legislation directed to
the problem of the financially irresponsible motorist.8 Typical of
such legislation is that requiring compulsory insurance9 or uninsured
motorist coverage in insurance policies issued within the particular
state.' 0 Unsatisfied judgment funds, which also have been established
in some states," are designed to compensate victims of the financially
5 It is difficult to determine the number and percentage of accidents

involving uninsured motorists since most of the suits never reach the litigation stage due to the inability of the defendant to pay. Tables indicate that
of the accidents reported in 1963, 88.5 percent involved insured motorists.

See, e.g., CALI oNIA ECONOMic DEv. AGENCY, CALiFoRNA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

1964, Table U-26, at 282 (1964).
6 See generally Comment, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A
Survey of State Legislation, 10 VILL. L. REv. 545 (1965).
7 See generally Bergan, A Thesis on Motor Vehicle Liability Without
Fault,28 ALuANy L. REV. 199 (1964); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives
on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHr. L. REV.
641 (1964); Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63
MicH. L. REV. 279 (1964); Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection--A Proposal
for Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REv. 329 (1964).
8 Buzzone v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 23 N.J. 447, 452, 129 A.2d
561, 564 (1957); Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 255, 73 N.W.2d 587, 593
(1955). For a good discussion on the various types of plans see Comment,
The Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A Survey of State Legislation, 10
VIL. L. REv. 545 (1965).

9 Massachusetts was the first state to enact a statute requiring every
person registering a motor vehicle in the state to show a certificate stating that
he had posted bond or deposited a sufficient amount of cash or securitities
with the state treasurer. Mass. Acts 1925, ch. 346, § 1, at 426, as enacted,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1968). Massachusetts' initiative
was followed by North Carolina in 1957 and New York in 1958. N.C. Sess.
Laws 1957, ch. 1393, § 1, at 1586, as enacted, N.C. GEr. STAT. ch. 20, § 20-309

(1965); N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 482, § 1, at 1289-90 (1959), as enacted, N.Y. VE_.

&

TRAP. LAw, § 312 (McKinney 1960).
10 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. AN. § 627.0851
(Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268.15 (Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE § 46750.14 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-.381 (Supp. 1968).
11 MD. ANx. CODE art. 66%k, §§ 150-79 (Supp. 1967); N.J. REv. STAT.
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irresponsible or unknown motorist. However, instead of adopting
any of the above plans, most American jurisdictions have enacted
some form of safety or financial responsibility act as the primary
means of protecting and compensating the innocent automobile accident victim.12
Financial responsibility acts are designed to provide security for
the victim of a driver's first accident through license or registration
suspension until payment of any judgment recovered, and to protect
the victims of subsequent accidents by requiring proof of the driver's
future financial responsibility by possession of insurance or other
designated means. The showing of financial responsibility is made
a precondition to the continued use of the highways after a driver
has been involved in an accident or held liable for damages to persons
or property resulting from an accident. 13 With few exceptions, 14 the
validity of such financial responsibility acts has been consistently
upheld against various constitutional objections. 15
It has been contended that the financial responsibility laws are
superior to other statutory methods of protecting innocent automobile accident victims in that they promote careful driving, segregate the careless motorist, encourage voluntary insurance, and induce
voluntary settlements out of court. 16 Such laws are also said to be
consistent with sound underwriting principles in that undesirable
§ 39: 6-61, -91 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. INs. LAW art. 17-A, § 600 (McKinney 1966);
N.D. REV. CODE § 39-17 (Supp. 1967). For an analysis and criticism of the
New York act see Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation: Past, Present and Future, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 215, 218 (1959).

See generally Elder, The Unsatisfied Judgment Fund and the Irresponsible
47, 54-59 (1954).
12 See Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TEXAs L. REV. 154, 157 (1959),
for a complete list of states. For a discussion of the background and basis
for financial responsibility laws throughout the United States, see Braun, The

'Motorist, in CURRENT TRENDs IN STATE LEGISLATION

FinancialResponsibility Law, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 505-18 (1936).
13 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16020, 16080, 16370.

14 See Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701 (1938). See also
In re Lindley, 108 Cal. App. 258, 291 P. 638 (1930), discredited in Watson v.
Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931). For the position
that the California Financial Responsibility Law is unconstitutional see Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Financial Responsibility Law,
4 CAL. W.L. REV. 89 (1968).
15 Equal protection clause: Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); People v. O'Rourke, 124 Cal. App. 752, 13
P.2d 989 (1932); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951). Due process
clause: Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Sheenan v. Division of Motor
Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P.2d 359 (1934); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153,
46 N.W.2d 52 (1951).
16 See generally Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility
Laws, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 519 (1936); Jones, Compulsory Automobile

Liability Insurance, Ass'N OF CAs. & SuR. ExEc. (1932); Stone, Some Views on
Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 13 A.B.A.J. 151, 153-54 (1927).
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risks are not forced upon the insurance carrier."'
The financial responsibility laws are not, however, without defects. One outstanding criticism is that they are "first bite" statutes;
that is, the first injury is permitted to occur before the financial
responsibility law begins to work.' 8 The first victim is not protected
against the financially irresponsible driver who is unable to respond
in damages, inasmuch as the wrongdoer merely loses his privilege to
operate a motor vehicle for the statutory period. Such laws also fail
to protect against hit-and-run and out-of-state drivers. 19

California's Financial Responsibility Law
When the California Vehicle Code was enacted in 1935,20 Division
7 encompassed the previously established financial responsibility
laws (sections 400 through 416). Division 7 was modeled after Article
IV of the uniform act sponsored by the National Conference on Street
and Highway Safety. Under the current California Vehicle Code,
sections 16000 through 16503 constitute the financial responsibility
21
laws.
Chapter 1 (sections 16000-16110) deals with "Security Following
Accident" while Chapter 2 (sections 16250-16377) deals with "Suspensions Following Unsatisfied Judgment." These sections apply to
accidents involving bodily injury, death or damage to property of
$100 or more. In such cases, the protection provided is that the driver
of each vehicle involved must, unless he complies with specified conditions for exemption, deposit security as specified by the Department of Motor Vehicles to satisfy any final judgment or judgments
rendered against him.2 2 Exemptions from the requirement of presenting security may be established, among other ways, by showing
that the owner of the vehicle involved is a self-insurer, 23 or by satisfactory evidence that the owner had a motor vehicle liability policy
or bond 24 complying with the statutory requirement in effect at the
time of the accident.25 Where the motorist fails to establish his
exemption, or to provide the security required under section 16050,
his privilege of driving a motor vehicle is suspended. 26
Stoeckel, Administrative Problems of Financial Responsibility Laws,
(1936).
1959, 38 TEXAs L. REV. 154, 157 (1959);
They Proceed on the Theory that Every Bum is Entitled to One Bump, 56
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 70, 73 .(1932).
17

3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 531, 534-35
18 Loiseaux, Innocent Victims

19 For a general criticism of financial responsibility laws see Comment,

The Need for Revision of FinancialResponsibility Legislation, 40 ILL. L. REV.
237, 240 (1945).
20 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, §§ 1-803, at 93-247.
21 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16000-503.
22 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16020.
23 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16055.
24 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16057-58.
25 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16059.
26 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §

16080.
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Chapter 3 (sections 16430 through 16487) provides for the various
means of giving proof of future ability to respond in damages when
required under Chapter 1 or 2 (after suspension for over one year
for failure to present security or after suspension for failure to satisfy
a judgment within thirty days).27 Proof of ability to respond in
damages may be given by the written certificate of an insurance
a
company authorized to do business within the state, certifying that
25
It
motor vehicle liability policy has been issued and is in effect.
may also be given by depositing with the Department of Motor Vehicles the sum of $25,000,29 or by the written certificate of a certified
self-insurer.3 0

Restrictions as to Classes of Persons
The Initial Confrontation
As noted above, after an accident the requirement of showing
ability to respond in damages may be fulfilled by a written certificate
that the motorist has been issued an automobile liability insurance
policy by an insurance company authorized to do business within the
state.31 Section 414(a) of the 1955 enactment of the California Motor
Vehicle Code (now section 16431) provided, in part:
Proof of ability to respond in damages may be given by the
written certificate or certificates of any insurance carrier duly authorized to do business within the State, that it has issued to or for the
benefit of the person named therein a motor vehicle liability policy or
policies as defined in Section 415 [now section 16450], which, at the
date of said certificate or certificates is in full force and effect .... 32
California Vehicle Code section 415 (a) (now section 16450), under the
1955 enactment of the code, provided:
A "motor vehicle liability policy" as used in this code means a policy
of liability insurance issued by an insurance carrier authorized to
transact such business in this State to or for the benefit of the person
named therein as assured, which policy shall meet the following requirements:
Such policy shall insure the person named therein and any
other person using or responsible for the use of said motor vevehicles with the express or implied permission
hicle or motor 33
of said assured.
In 1957, the Supreme Court of California was presented the question whether, in light of section 415 (a) (2), an insurance company
(2)

27 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§

28 CAL. VEHICLE CODE

§

16082, 16371.
16431, formerly Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, § 414a,

at 158.

16435.
16436.
31 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16431, formerly Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, § 414a,
29 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §
30 CAL.

at 158.

VEHICLE CODE §

32 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, § 414a, at 158.
33 Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 840, § 5, at 2356.
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authorized to do business in the state of California could, by restrictive endorsement in a policy not offered as proof of financial
responsibility under section 414, limit coverage to the named insured
and his immediate family.34 More specifically, did section 415 (a) (2)
apply only to those policies which were offered as proof of financial
responsibility or was it applicable to all automobile insurance policies, either certified or voluntary, issued or delivered in the state?
Did "shall insure the person named therein and any other person
using ... said vehicle" apply only to those policies which were
certified as proof of financial responsibility or did it apply to all
policies issued within the state whether certified or not? The answer
was enunciated
in Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance
35
Company.
Wildman involved an insurance policy containing a restrictive endorsement that attempted to limit coverage to the insured and his
immediate family. The restrictive clause provided:
With respect to the insurance for Bodily Injury Liability and
Property Damage Liability the unqualified word "insured" includes
the named insured, the individual named below, and any member
of the insured's immediate family
No EXcEPTIONS

while using the automobile or legally responsible for the use thereof,
provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of
the named insured.3 6
At the time of the accident, in which a Mrs. Wildman was injured, the insured car was being driven by one Victoria Villanueva
with the permission of the insured. Mrs. Wildman claimed that
the restrictive endorsement was ambiguous and should be construed
in her favorY7 The insurer, Government Employees' Insurance Company, contended that the endorsement was unambiguous and provided
coverage only when the automobile was being operated by the named
38
insured or by one of his immediate family. ,
The court held that the endorsement was ambiguous 39 that the
construction proposed by the defendant insurance carrier would
violate section 415;40 and that section 415 was intended by the legislature to be, and is, a part of every policy of motor vehicle liability
insurance issued by an insurance carrier authorized to do business in
the state, whether that policy was entered into voluntarily by insurer
and insured or was entered into for the purpose of satisfying the
requirements of the Financial Responsibility Laws relative to a certifi34 Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307
P.2d 359 (1957).
35

Id.

36
3T

Id. at 34, 307 P.2d at 361.

38
39
40

Id. at 35, 307 P.2d at 361.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 40, 307 P.2d at 365.
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41
cate of insurance by the insurer of a policy carried on the insured.
In Justice Carter's words:
It appears that section 415 must be made a part of every policy of
insurance issued by an insurer since the public policy of this state
is to make owners of motor vehicles financially responsible to those
[F] or an ininjured by them in the operation of such vehicles ....
surer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an accident
which occurs when a person other than the insured, is driving with
the permission and consent of the insured is a violation of the public
policy of this state as set forth in [section] . . . 415 of the Vehicle
Code.

Inasmuch as [section] . . . 415 of the Vehicle Code set[s] forth
the public policy of this state such laws must be considered a part of
the policy itself does
every policy of liability insurance even though
42
not specially make such laws a part thereof.
As will be seen, the public policy enunciated in Wildman became the
basis for later decisions holding43 various types of exclusionary clauses
invalid as against public policy.
On the authority of Wildman and the public policy proclaimed
therein, the California courts have held consistently that section 415
(now sections 16450 and 16451) must be read into every policy of
automobile liability insurance issued or delivered within the state
44
affording coverage on any part of the public roads and highways.
The courts have been loath to overturn the public policy espoused
in Wildman, and have remained steadfast in their conviction that
section 415 is not to be limited merely to those policies which are
certified as proof of financial responsibility but applies to all automobile insurance policies issued or delivered within the state. In
fact, the courts have shut their eyes to clear indications from the
legislature of an intent to abrogate this rule of public policy.
The 1957 Amendment and Its Interpretation

Wildman was decided by the supreme court in February of 1957
41
42
43

Id.

Id. at 39, 40, 307 P.2d at 364, 364-65.
Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 364 P.2d 833, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1961) (garage exclusion); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959) (customer exclusion); Wheeling
v. Financial Indem. Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 36, 19 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962) (military
personnel exclusion); Royal Exch. Assurance v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 662, 10 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1961); Bonfils v. Pacific Auto. Ins.
Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 766 (1958) (exclusion of others than insured); Cassin v. Financial Indem. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 631, 325 P.2d 228
(1958) (exclusion of drivers over 60 years old) (dictum).
44 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d
318, 419 P.2d 641, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); Uber v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 247 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 616-17, 55 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (1967); General Ins. Co. v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 421-22, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1966); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 541, 543, 43
Cal. Rptr. 26, 27-28 (1965).
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while the California Legislature was still in session. Before adjourning, but after the Wildman decision was handed down, the legislature amended section 415 of the California Vehicle Code as follows:
A "motor vehicle policy" as used in this chapter means an owner's
policy or an operator's policy, or both, of liability insurance, certifled as provided in section 414 as proof of ability to respond in damages, issued by an insurance carrier authorized to transact such
business in this State to or for the benefit of the person named therein
as assured.
(b)

Such owner's policy of liability insurance:

(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with
the express or implied permission of said assured, against loss from
the liability imposed by law .... 45

It would appear that the legislative intent behind the amendment
to section 415 was to make that section dependent upon section 414.
That is, a policy of liability insurance must be "certified" under section 414 in order to become a "motor vehicle liability policy" within
the terms of section 415, thereby limiting the nature of the restrictions
which validly could be imposed upon the scope of its coverage. Dictum
in American Automobile Insurance Company v. Republic Indemnity
Company,46 and subsequent cases, 47 tended to support this interpretation. These cases suggested that the 1957 change in phraseology
was material and indicated an intent on the part of the legislature
to change the meaning of the provision, rather than merely to interpret it. In Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company,4 however, the Supreme Court of California, in reversing
the judgment of the lower court, 4 9 dismissed the interpretation of
cases like American Automobile on the ground that the public policy
of the state, as enunciated by Wildman, was to make "owners of motor
vehicles financially responsible to those injured by them in the oper45 Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 1654, § 1, at 3034 (emphasis added).
46 52 Cal. 2d 507, 511, 341 P.2d 675, 677 (1959).
47 Globe Indem. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d
9, 13-14, 20 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76 (1962); Royal Exch. Assurance v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 662, 667, 10 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (1961).
48 58 Cal. 2d 142, 373 P.2d 640, 23 Cal. Rpfr. 592 (1962).
49 It is of interest to note that the trial court and the district court of
appeal cited American Automobile Insurance Company v. Republic Indemnity Company and the dictum in that case to the effect that the amendment
constituted a change in the meaning of section 415 rather than merely an
interpretation of the section. The district court of appeal held that the effect
of the "1957 amendment

. . .

was to terminate as of September 11, 1957, the

prior declaration of public policy and to end the requirement that permissive
users be covered. This is the clear implication of the decision in American
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Republic Indem. Co....

and is obvious from

an analysis of the amended statute." 17 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1962) (emphasis
added).
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ation of such vehicles." 50 The court reasoned that to give the suggested interpretation to the 1957 amendment would have the effect of
limiting the application of Wildman to the small number (less than
1 percent of the total) of automobile liability policies which are
certified annually to the Department of Motor Vehicles.
The court went on to say that there was no "cogent and convincing evidence" which would permit it to attribute to the legislature
an intent to overturn a sound rule of public policy.51 The court's
statement as to the lack of "cogent and convincing evidence" appears
to be unfounded, as well as inconsistent with its own earlier statement in American Automobile to the effect that the 1957 amendment had made a "material change in the phraseology of the section,
and such a change is ordinarily viewed as showing an intention on
the part of the legislature to change the meaning of the provision
rather than interpret it."52 Indeed, the changes to section 415 would
seem to come within the well-settled principle of statutory construction that a material change in the phraseology of a legislative enacton the part of the legislature to
ment is viewed as showing an intent
53
change the meaning of the statute.
Interpretation of Similar Provisions in Other Jurisdictions
The court's interpretation of section 415, as amended in 1957,
appears even more strained when contrasted with the interpretation
given similar provisions of financial responsibility laws in other jurisdictions. Although a few states require omnibus coverage (coverage
as to third persons driving with the express or implied permission of
the insured) by statute in all insurance policies issued in the particular
state,54 the majority of jurisdictions require such coverage only in
50 Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307
P.2d 359, 364 (1957).

51 Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 152, 373
P.2d 640, 645, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (1962).
52 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 511,
341 P.2d 675, 677 (1959).
53 Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 754, 761, 344 P.2d 788,
792 (1959); People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 142, 162 P.2d 1, 14 (1946);
Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal. 2d 746, 750, 82 P.2d 1, 3 (1938); Burbank v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 180 Cal. App. 2d 451, 462, 4 Cal. Rptr. 757, 763 (1960).
54 Wis. STAT. § 204.30 (3) (Supp. 1968) requires omnibus coverage in automobile liability insurance policies issued or delivered in Wisconsin. See Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc., 262 Wis. 567, 55 N.W.2d 903 (1952). See also
Drewek v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 207 Wis. 445, 240 N.W. 881 (1932). MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 1A, 34A (1958) requires omnibus coverage in all
automobile liability insurance policies issued in compliance with its compulsory insurance law. See Service Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Aronofsky, 308 Mass.
See also Dickinson v. Great Am. Indem. Co.,
249, 31 N.E.2d 837 (1941).
296 Mass. 368, 6 N.E.2d 439 (1937). In 1957, New Hampshire enacted N.H. Laws
1957, ch. 305:10, at 300, as enacted, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:2-a (1968),
which required that all automobile liability insurance policies issued or de-
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those automobile insurance policies offered as proof of financial responsibility.65 The financial responsibility laws of these states are
similar to those of California in that they require proof of the financial
responsibility of the driver of a motor vehicle who is involved in an
accident and has a judgment rendered against him.5 6 Policies acceptable as proof of financial responsibility are subject to extensive regulation; for example, the requirement of omnibus coverage.
The wording of the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law, for
example,.5 7 is quite similar to the California statute as amended in
1957. It provides:
(a) Proof of financial responsibility may be made by filing with the
Secretary of State the written certificate of any insurance carrier
duly authorized to do business in this State, certifying that it
has issued to or for the benefit of the person... a motor vehicle liability policy ... meeting the requirements of this Act
Section 7A-317 of this enactment defines a motor vehicle liability
policy in language similar to that used in section 415 of the California
Financial Responsibility Laws:
A "motor vehicle liability policy," as that term is used in this Act,
means an "owner's policy" or an "operator's policy" of liability insurance, certified as provided in Section 7A-315 ... as proof of financial
responsibility for the future, and issued . . . by an insurance carrier
duly authorized to transact business in this State, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as insured.
(b) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
.58

(2)

Shall insure the person named therein and any other person
using or responsible for the use of said motor vehicle or
vehicles with the express or implied permission of said insured ....
59

livered in New Hampshire contain the same coverage which was statutorily
required for automobile liability insurance policies issued as proof of financial
responsibility. Since policies issued as proof of financial responsibility were
required to contain omnibus coverage, the net effect is that all automobile
liability policies issued or delivered in the state must contain omnibus
coverage.
56 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d 500, 502 (4th
Cir. 1956) (South Carolina); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer,
177 F.2d 793, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1959) (Virginia). See also Duff v. Alliance Mut.
Cas. Co., 296 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1961) (Oklahoma); Hawkeye-Security Ins.
Co. v. Myers, 210 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1954) (Illinois); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox,
102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Accident Guar. Corp., 87 N.H. 374, 180 A. 249 (1935); Cohen v. Metropolitan Cas.
Ins. Co., 233 App. Div. 340, 252 N.Y.S. 841 (1931); Anderson v. American Auto.
Ins. Co., 50 R.I. 502, 149 A. 797 (1930); Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602 (1955); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arghyris,
189 Va. 913, 55 S.E.2d 16 (1949).
56 See Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TExAs L. REV. 154, 157 (1959),
for a complete list of states and respective statutes.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §§ 7A-101, 7A-502 (Supp. 1967).
58 ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 95%, § 7A-315 (Supp. 1967).
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95%, § 7A-317 (Supp. 1967).
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In contrast to the California courts, however, the Illinois courts have
held that a policy which is voluntary and not offered as proof of
financial responsibility is not required to contain the omnibus coverage prescribed by section 7A-317. 60
Other states, including New York,61 Missouri,6 2 Iowa,68 Texas,6 4
Arkansas, 65 Louisiana,6 6 Oklahoma, 67 Alaska,6 8 and Virginia, 69 with
provisions in their financial responsibility laws almost identical to
sections 414 and 415 of the California Vehicle Code, have held that
the omnibus coverage requirement applies only to those policies
actually certified under the act as proof of ability to respond in
damages.70 Indeed, it seems to be the general rule that a voluntary
policy which is not given as proof of future financial responsibility
is not affected to any extent by the provisions of the financial
responsibility statute.7 '
It should also be noted that the result reached in Ohio Casualty
cannot be justified on the basis of a difference in the purpose underlying the California Responsibility Laws. Other jurisdictions, with
60 Gray v. Maryland Cas. Co., 152 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. 11. 1957); McCann
v. Continental Cas. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 476, 134 N.E.2d 302 (1956); Porterfield v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 288 Ill. App. 2d 195, 171 N.E.2d 108 (1960).
61 N.Y. VFH. & TAF. LAw § 345 (McKinney 1960).
62 Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190 (Supp. 1967).
63 IOWA CODE § 321A.21 (1966).
64 TEx. Rsv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 6701h, § 21 (Supp. 1967).
65 AiK. STAT. ANN.§ 75-1466 (Supp. 1967).
66 LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:900 (1963).
67 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-324 (Supp. 1962).
68 ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440 (Supp. 1967).
69 Virginia, in order to eliminate any question about the application of
its financial responsibility law, amended its law in 1948, [1948] VA. AcTs
ch. 201, § 14-A, at 438 as follows: "It is provided however that the provisions
of this act shall not apply to any policy of insurance except as to liability
thereunder incurred after certification thereof as proof of financial responsibility."
70 Jones v. Mid-South Ins. Co., 358 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1966) (Louisiana);
Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949)
(Virginia); Gray v. Maryland Cas. Co., 152 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. IMI. 1957); Hoosier
Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952); Hart v. National Indem.
Co., 422 P.2d 1015 (Alas. 1967); Perkins v. Perkins, 284 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1955);
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362, 225 A.2d 570 (1966); Buzzone v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 41 N.J. 511, 125 A.2d 551 (1956); Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Albarez, 380 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); McCarthy v.
Insurance Co. of Texas, 271 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
71 Duff v. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co., 296 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1961); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1956); HawkeyeSecurity Ins. Co. v. Myers, 210 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1954); Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Mullin, 156 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Ark. 1957); State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Kooiman, 143 F. Supp. 614 (D.S.D. 1956); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Iowa 1952).
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similar statutes, have expressed a purpose similar to that expressed
in Wildman and Ohio Casualty, but have not extended the implementation of that public policy to the case of voluntary insurance. 2
Recodification
Section 415 was amended again in 1959 while being recodified by
the legislature. 73 Subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) were changed into
separate sections encompassing sections 16450, 16451, and 16452
respectively. In addition, the opening word of each paragraph was
changed from "Such" to "An." Considering the handling of the 1957
Amendment by the courts, it was no surprise that these changes
were insufficient to overturn Wildman, and, in fact, failed to evoke
new judicial expressions.

Restrictions as to Named Persons
Bohrn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Following the rule set down in Wildman and reiterated in Ohio
Casualty, the courts have held several types of exclusionary clauses
invalid as contravening public policy. These have included a garage
exclusion 7 4 a customer exclusion, 5 a driver over 60 years old exclusion,7 6 and "others" than the insured exclusion,7 7 and a military
personnel exclusion.78 However, not until Bohrn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company79 was the court asked to determine the validity of such a restrictive endorsement excluding a
72

See, e.g., Gonzales v. Department of Public Safety, 340 S.W.2d 860,

863-64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); "The purpose and intent of the Legislature in
enacting the Texas Safety Responsibility Law was to promote safe driving
practices among all owners and operators of motor vehicles . . . and to re-

quire such owners and operators to discharge their financial responsibility to
others for damage to persons or property occasioned by the exercise, by such
owner or operator, of the privilege or license of using the public highways
of this State." Id. at 863-64. See also Jones v. Mid-South Ins. Co., 358 F.2d
887, 888 (5th Cir. 1966); Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 28 fIl. 2d 601, 605-09,
192 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (1963).
73 Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 3, § 16451, at 1649.
74 Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 364 P.2d 833, 15
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1961); Clark v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App.
2d 746, 43 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1965); Royal Exch. Assur. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 662, 10 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1961).
75 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341

P.2d 675 (1959).
76 Cassin v. Financial Indem. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 631, 325 P.2d 228
(1958) (dictum).
77

Bonfils v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 766

(1958).
78 Wheeling v. Financial Indem. Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 36, 19 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1962).
79

226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 38 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1964).
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specifically named individual.
Billy Bohrn, while driving his father's 1955 Dodge, struck and
injured a pedestrian. Billy's father had a policy with State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company which contained the following restrictive endorsement:
[I]t is agreed that the Company shall not be liable and no liability or
obligation of any kind shall attach to the Company for losses or damage sustained while any automobile insured hereunder is driven or
operated by Bill A. Bohrn except when accompanied by the named

insured or the named insured's spouse.SO
At the time of the accident, Billy was alone, but was driving with his
father's express permission. An action was commenced by the injured pedestrian against both Billy and his father. When State Farm
refused to defend in that action, Bohrn brought an action for declaratory relief. The trial court held the exclusionary clause to be null
and void as against public policy. State Farm appealed on the grounds
that the bar to restrictive endorsements, as enunciated by Wildman,
applied only to classes of permissive users and not to named individuals; 81 and that section 11580.1(e), which had just recently been added
88
to the Insurance Code,82 allowed such a named exclusion.
State Farm's first contention was based on a statement of the
opinion rendered in Ohio Casualty that "[a]ny provision in a policy
which purported to exclude certain classes of permissive users from
coverage was declared to be contrary to this public policy and, therefore, void." 84 The court held the clause in the State Farm policy
invalid as against public policy and found that State Farm's interpretation was unwarranted, untenable, and contrary to the rule of
liberal construction given the entire automobile responsibility laws.
Further, the court indicated that by their reading of Wildman, no
language could be found in that decision which supported State
Farm's contention. The court went on to say that "the Supreme Court
made it abundantly clear that the omnibus coverage of permissive
drivers was truly total, and that considerations of public policy
brooked no exceptions." 85
As to section 11580.1, which was added to the Insurance Code
during the session of the legislature following the Ohio Casualty
decision, the court refused to apply it or consider its effect, based on
80 Id. at 499, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 78.

81 Id. at 502, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
82 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 1, at 2780.
83 Bohrn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 500,
38 Cal. Rptr. 77, 78 (1964).
84 Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 150, 373
P.2d 640, 644, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (1962) (emphasis added). It is interesting
to note that this identical language was again employed in a subsequent
case. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 227,
233, 51 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1966).

85 Bohm v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 502,
38 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1964).
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the fact that it had been enacted after the policy was issued to Bohn
and could not be given a retroactive effect.8 6
1963 Amendments
As mentioned above, after the Ohio Casualty decision was handed
down by the Supreme Court of California, the legislature, at its next
session, added section 11580.187 to the Insurance Code. At the same
time, and by the same act, sections 1645088 and 1605789 of the Vehicle Code were amended.
Section 16450 of the California Vehicle Code was amended to
read:
A "motor vehicle liability policy," as used in Chapters 2, 3, and 4
of this division, means an owner's policy or an operator's policy, or
both, of liability insurance, certified as provided in Section 16431 as
proof of ability to respond in damages, issued by an insurance carrier authorized to transact such business in this State to or for the
benefit of the person named therein as assured. Any requirements
set forth in said Chapters 2, 3, and 4 relating to a motor vehicle liability policy shall apply only to those policies which have been
certified as proof of ability to respond in damages as provided in
Section 16431.90

Section 16057 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, provided that in
order to establish an exemption from the "security following accident"
provisions of the financial responsibility laws, the terms of a policy
were required to comport with the requirements of sections 11580,
11580.1, and 11580.2 of the Insurance Code and section 16059 of the
Vehicle Code, "but need not contain provisions other than those
required by said sections."91 Note that no reference was made to
sections 16450 or 16451 of the Vehicle Code.
Section 11580.1, which was added to the Insurance Code, provided:
No policy of liability insurance covering liability arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be issued or delivered in this State to the owner of a motor vehicle ...
unless it contains the following provisions:
d)

(e)

Provision insuring the named therein and to the same extent
that coverage is afforded such named insured in respect to said
described motor vehicles, any other person using, or legally
responsible for the use of, said motor vehicles, provided the
motor vehicles are being used by the named insured or with
his permission, express or implied.
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions, the insurer and any
named insured may, by the terms of such policy or by a separate writing, agree that coverage under the policy shall not
apply while said motor vehicles are being used by a natural

86 Id. at 505, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
87 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 1, at 2780.
88 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 3, at 2781.

89 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 2, at 2781.
90 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 3, at 2781 (emphasis added).
91 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 2, at 2781 (emphasis added).
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person or persons designated by name. Such agreement by
any named insured92
shall be binding upon every insured to whom
such policy applies.

What was the effect of these changes? The draftsmen and sponsors of the 1963 amending act felt that the legislature, by clear and
unequivocal language, had changed, at least to some extent, the rule
announced by the supreme court in Wildman and Ohio Casualty 3
It appeared that the legislature had modified Wildman by making
statutory the state's public policy with respect to the required content or scope of coverage of automobile liability insurance policies
which are not certified according to section 16431 of the Vehicle
Code and by specifically manifesting an intent that voluntary policies be governed exclusively by Vehicle Code section 16059 and sections 11580, 11580.1 and 11580.2 of the Insurance Code. This, of course,
would have the ancillary effect of limiting the application of section
16451 solely to those policies which had been certified as proof of
ability to respond in damages. The rewording of section 16450 to
the effect that it and section 16451 "shall apply only to those
policies which have been certified as proof of ability to respond in
damages" 94 definitely indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to so limit 16451 to certified policies. For what other purpose
could the legislature have added 11580.1(d) which requires basically
the same omnibus coverage as the supreme court interpreted section
16451 to require in Wildman and Ohio Casualty?
Vehicle Code section 16057, as amended, is also indicative of legislative intent to limit section 16451 to certified policies. Section 16057
relates to voluntary policies and the legislature specifically declared
that such policies "need not contain provisions other than those required by" section 16059 of the Vehicle Code and sections 11580,
11580.1 and 11580.2 of the Insurance Code. 5 No mention was made of
either section 16450 or section 16451 of the Vehicle Code.
As to voluntary policies, by this interpretation section 11580.1 of
the Insurance Code would have the effect of preventing broad exclusionary clauses while preserving the right of the insurer and the insured to exclude coverage as to any named individual or individuals
who might be bad risks. Section 16451 (formerly 415) of the Vehicle
Code would be limited to policies offered as proof of financial responsibility and would prevent any exclusion as to permittee drivers
in such policies, whether specifically named or not. The effect of
this legislation, if so interpreted, would have been to return the law
to a status similar, but not identical, to that which existed prior to
Wildman. That is, it is possible that the legislature was attempting
to implement part of the public policy enunciated in Wildman insofar
92

Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 1, at 2780 (emphasis added).

03 Address by John R. Maloney, Pacific Claim Executives Association
Meeting, April 26, 1968, on file in Hastings Law Library.
04 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 3, at 2781.
95 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1259, § 2, at 2781.
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as prohibiting general exclusionary clauses in voluntary policies while
allowing the insurance companies the right to insure and select their
own risks to the extent of declining exposure to known dangerous
risks. However, the California courts have given the amendments no
such interpretation.
Abbott v. Interinsurance Exchange9

6

The 1963 legislative act which added section 11580.1 to the Insurance Code and amended sections 16450 and 16057 of the Vehicle Code
was tested in Abbott v. Interinsurance Exchange, decided by the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in 1968. H.J. Abbott and his wife were
issued an automobile insurance policy by Interinsurance Exchange of
the Automobile Club of Southern California insuring them against
claims made by other persons for damage caused in the operation of
their automobile. Their son, Barry, had a bad driving record, and to
avoid a higher rate, his parents signed an endorsement which excluded coverage while Barry was driving the car in question. Barry,
driving with his parents' permission, collided with another vehicle
operated by one Batchehelder. An action was brought against the
Abbotts, who requested Interinsurance to defend in the action. Interinsurance declined to defend, claiming that the policy was not effective
due to the exclusionary clause.97 Abbott sued for declaratory relief.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that the public
policy of California, as expressed in section 16451 of the Vehicle Code
and announced in Wildman, still required insurance policies issued
within the state to apply to injuries suffered by third parties at the
hands of negligent permittee drivers of the insured car. The court
stated that while section 11580.1(e) of the Insurance Code allowed insurer and the insured by contract to restrict coverage as between
themselves, section 11580.1 did not change the law as established by
Vehicle Code section 16451 when innocent third parties were involved.
Thus, the insurance company was obligated, as to innocent third
parties, to satisfy any judgment or judgments rendered against the
insured.98
Interinsurance Exchange had contended that the legislature, by
adopting section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code, changed the public
policy of the state with respect to protecting innocent third parties,
and that the wording of section 16450, as amended in 1963, conformed
with the provisions of section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code to effect
the above change in public policy as to "noncertified policies." 99 As
to section 16450, the court rejected Interinsurance Exchange's interpretation. The court was of the opinion that the purpose of the
1963 amendment (which provided that any requirement set forth in
96 260 A.C.A. 546, 67 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1968).
97 Id. at 548, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
98 Id. at 549, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.

99 Id. at 554, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the Financial Responsibility Laws applied
only to those policies which had been certified) was merely to
refer to one means of proof of the ability of the owner of a car to
respond in damages and ... that it was not the intention of the Legislature, in such a furtive way, to abrogate the public policy of
this state as it is expressed in section 16451 of the Vehicle Code and an
unbroken line of specific court decisions."1 00
The court also rejected Interinsurance Exchange's contention that
section 11580.1(e) of the Insurance Code allowed an insurer and an
insured to exclude coverage while a named individual was driving so
as to effectively prevent an innocent third party, injured by the excluded permittee-driver, from recovering against the insurance company. The court relied on the Wildman determination that the public
policy behind section 16451 was to protect the innocent victim. This
public policy requires that section 16451 must be made a part of
every automobile liability insurance policy and that such exclusionary
clauses must necessarily be invalid with respect to third parties.' 01
It would appear that the public policy rule of Wildman was preserved by the court's interpretation of section 11580.1 of the Insurance
Code. Thus, as between an insurer and an insured, a named-driver
exclusion is valid and enforceable and an insurer is entitled to be
indemnified by the insured for any amount which it might be compelled to pay on a judgment recovered by an injured third party
claimant where the excluded person was driving the automobile. But
as to the innocent third party, such a named driver exclusion is unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The burden is put upon
the insurance company to recover from the insured any amount paid
to such "innocent" third party claimants, and if the insured is otherwise "irresponsible," the insurance company, rather than the third
party, suffers the loss.
The opinion of the court contains no indication that it was aware
of the fact that the 1963 amendment to section 16450 of the Vehicle
Code was part of the same legislative act which added section 11580.1
to the Insurance Code. The fact that these changes were accomplished
in one legislative act would seem to lend support to the argument,
previously advanced, that there was an intent on the part of the legislature to modify the rule of public policy established by Wildman.
It is also interesting to note that there is no evidence on the face of
the opinion that the court realized that Vehicle Code section 16057
was also amended by the same legislative act. In fact, the opinion
is devoid of comment as to the effect or significance of the amendment
to section 16057.

Conclusion
The legislature, in the recent 1968 session, has responded to
Abbott by amending section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code and sections
100 Id. at 555, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 226.

101 Id. at 549, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
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16451 and 16057 of the Vehicle Code, again by a single legislative act.
The amendments to these sections have been approved, were signed
by the Governor, and became effective 60 days after the legislature adjourned. 0 3 The amending language indicates, even more
clearly then did the 1963 Amendment, a legislative intent to over-

turn Wildman.

Section 11580.1(e) of the Insurance Code was amended to provide:
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivision or the provisions of
article 2 (commencing with Section 16450), Chapter 3, Division 7

of the Vehicle Code, the insurer and any named insured may,
by the terms of such policy or by a separate writing, agree that
coverage under the policy shall not apply, nor accrue to the
benefit of the insured or any third party claimant, while said

motor vehicles are being used by a natural person or persons
designated by name. Such agreement by any named insured
shall be binding upon every insured to whom such policy applies and upon every third party claimant.'0 4

Sections 16451 and 16057 of the Vehicle Code were not changed substantially. 0 5 As amended, section 11580.1 leaves little doubt of a
legislative intent to overturn the public policy pronounced by Wildman, at least to the extent of permitting exclusionary clauses as to
named individuals. Just how the California courts will interpret
this new amendment, however, cannot be determined.
Although one can appreciate and approve the laudable objectives
of section 16451 as enunciated by Wildman under the term "public
policy," the court should nevertheless confine itself to the specific
means prescribed by the legislature for achieving this goal. No
general statement of court-made public policy should override or
add to the plain and unequivocal provisions of an act. Even though
the public policy enunciated by the Supreme Court of California in
Wildman may be desirable, or perhaps should be the primary policy,
the fact remains that it is the function of the legislature, and not the
courts, to determine the public policy of the state.
The protection of innocent victims of automobile accidents is
only one of many competing policies which the legislature considered
when enacting the 1957, 1963 and 1968 legislation. Other factors,
such as the sound underwriting principle that an insurance carrier
should be able to select and determine its own risks and not be forced
to expose itself to known dangerous risks, and the freedom to contract
which allows insurer and insured to write the type of policy they desire and to limit its coverage by plain language, are equally valid considerations of public policy. It is hoped that the California courts will
Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1314, § 2, at 2402.
103 Since the legislature adjourned on September 13, 1968, the amendments to section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code and sections 16451 and 16057
of the Vehicle Code became effective on November 13, 1968.
104 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1314, § 1, at 2402-03.
105 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1314, §§ 3-4, at 2404.
102
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now give effect to the clear legislative intent expressed in the 1968
amendment to section 11580.1.
Jack E. Ferguson*
* Member, Second Year Class

